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directors thereof for simple nonfeasance of duty to the
corporation or fraud in its management or mismanagement
in the disposition of the money or property of the
corporation in the absence of an active intent to deceive or
defraud the plaintiff."
The duty which the trust theory and the foreseeable injury approach would impose on the directors of a corporation to its creditors has not been looked on with favor by our courts. These theories,
even though limited to those cases where "gross negligence" has
caused or increased insolvency, pose significant problems with
respect to multiplicity of suits and the determination of damages.
Therefore, it is felt that the majority of courts, including West Virginia, have justifiably rejected individual actions by corporate creditors against corporate directors when the directors have negligently
mismanaged the corporation's affairs."
Paul R. Rice

Criminal Law-Self-Defense--Justification Needed
for Use of Deadly Force
D, alone in her home with her children, heard an intruder at her
window. Alarmed, she went across the street and telephoned the
sheriff's office, where her husband was employed. After her husband arrived on the scene, he showed her how to use a shotgun,
and then returned to his duties. Later, D noticed the blind and
draperies moving in her T.V. room. She also heard the window
being raised slowly. Taking the gun in hand, she arose and fired
in the direction of the window. The resulting blast mortally
wounded the deceased, who was in the line of fire. Upon trial
for murder, D relied on self-defense. After conviction for second
23

Id. at 545, 17 S.E. at 53.

equitable creditor's bill may permit the creditors to sue the
negligent directors as a class after the corporation has become insolvent and
a demand has been made on the stockholders or receiver to take action against
the directors and it has been refused. Ellis v. H. P. Gates Merchantile Co.,
24An

103 Miss. 560, 60 So. 649 (1913). See generally, 3

FLcETHER, CYcLoPEDIA

ov m LAw OF ComoRATONS, § 1183 (1965) and Annot., 50 A.L.R. 462,
473 (1927). This is an asset of the corporation and the creditors can sue
in the right of the corporation. Browne v. Hammett, 133 S.C. 446, 131 S.E.
612 (1926).
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degree murder, D assigned error. One assignment was based on the
court's refusal to set aside the verdict and grant D a new trial on the
ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence. One
specific point of contention concerned whether self-defense was a
proper defense for D under the circumstances. Held; no error.
Even if D believed that she was in danger of great bodily harm
and was attempting to protect herself, she assumed the risk in so
doing. State v. Hamric, 151 S.E.2d 252 (W.Va. 1966).
This case represents the latest pronouncement on the right to
use force for self-defense in West Virginia. Unfortunately, it clouds
what previously had been a rather clear question.
In order to understand the court's holding in this case, it is first
necessary to consider the problem of reasonable belief as to necessity of force. Today, it is generally held that one free from fault
may use nondeadly force to the extent that seems necessary to
prevent personal harm. This he may do without yielding.'
On the question of the use of deadly force for self-defense, the
majority follows the "no retfeat" rule. According to this doctrine,
an innocent person may stand his ground and use deadly force if
this reasonably seems necessary to save himself. 2 West Virginia
follows this rule.3
However, under the minority or "retreat" rule, an innocent victim
of a murderous attack must retreat if a way is safely open to him,
rather than resort to deadly force.4 There are certain exceptions
to this rule however, including the situation presented in the instant
case, i.e., defense of the habitation.
The right to use force to prevent an unlawful entry of one's
habitation has been consistantly recognized.' In fact, defense of the
habitation was the most favored form of self-defense under the early
common law. In nearly all modem jurisdictions, the use of deadly
force is permitted to defend the habitation if such force reasonably
'People v. Katz, 263 App. Div. 883, 32 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1942).

2

People v. Bush, 414 IIl. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953); 40 C.J.S.,
Homicide § 128 (1944).
3 State v. Donahue, 70 W. Va. 260, 90 S.E. 834 (1916).
4 State v. Lee, 36 Del. 11, 171 Atl. 195 (1933); 40 C.J.S. Homicide §

128 (1944).

5 Laney v. U.S., 294 Fed. 412 (D.C. Cir. 1923); State v. Preece, 116
W. Va. 176, 179 S.E 524 (1935).
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appears necessary to protect the occupants from the commission
of a felony or great bodily harm.6 Therefore, in a case such as the
one before us, the right to defend one's self would be essentially
the same under both the "retreat" and "no retreat" rules.
As suggested above, when an attack is made upon the dwelling,
the law does not require that the danger should be real, that is, that
the peril should actually exist, in order to entitle the householder
to use deadly force.' All that is usually required is that the householder have a reasonable belief that such force is necessary. In
determining reasonableness, the jury should consider the situation
as it appeared to the accused at the time of the homicide.'
In past decisions, the West Virginia court has aligned itself
with this prevailing viewpoint. Yet, in the instant case, the statement that if the defendant believed she was in great danger and
was protecting herself "from apparent danger, she assumed the risk
in so doing"9 is indeed troublesome. This terse statement, without
accompaning explanation, raises a question of the court's intention.
In reviewing the issue of self-defense the court had to determine
whether the verdict was supported by the evidence. Since there
seemed to be a dispute of facts as to the existence of mitigating
circumstances, the issue was properly left to the jury. It seems
probable that the court, in deciding that the evidence was sufficient
to support the verdict, felt that a guilty verdict, such as was rendered, was a "risk" that the defendant assumed. However, this is
not clear from the court's statement.
After the disputed phrase, two West Virginia cases were cited
as authority."° These are derivatives of the principle first promulgated in State v. Cain." In that decision, it was stated that while
the actor is the judge of the necessity and reasonableness of deadly
force, "he acts at his peril, as the jury must pass upon his action...
viewing said actions from the prisoner's standpoint at the time
of the killing."' 2
CRnumvA LAW, 913 (1957).
7 State v. Perkins, 88 Conn. 360, 91 Adt. 265 (1914).
8 Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 669, 112 S.E. 861 (1922).
6 PEars,

90State v. Hamric, 151 S.E.2d 252, 264 (W. Va. 1966).
' State v. DeBoard, 119 W. Va. 396, 194 S.E. 349 (1938); State v.
Toler, 129 W. Va. 575, 41 S.E.2d 850 (1946).
" State v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 679, 707 (1892).
12

Ibid.
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The concept that the defendant acts "at his peril" has been
continued through many West Virginia cases, each interpreting
the phrase as did the court in Cain. It seems that the court in the
instant case may have translated the phrase "acts at his peril" into
"she assumed the risk." Unfortunately, the court did not go on to
explain the full implication of its statement, as in Cain.
A second appellate review function in similar situations is to
determine if the instruction on self defense is properly presented
to the jury. Due to this function, the lack of explanation of the
phrase "assumed the risk" could easily lead one to believe that this
is proper in an instruction to the jury. If viewed in this manner, the
phrase could impose a strict liability upon one attempting to use
justification as a defense for deadly force. If a defendant mistakenly
used deadly force under a reasonable belief of its necessity, he
would still be culpable. Thus, if this principle were carried to its
logical conclusion, one could envision a whole host of situations
where people guilty of no more than a reasonable mistake would
be stripped of any defensive claim, permitting their conviction of
purposeful crimes.
Hopefully, the court is still adhering to its older and accepted
Cain-oriented viewpoint. One bright sign is that the instructions
given to the jury, while not discussed in the principal case, included a full explanation of justification for deadly force in accord
with the accepted majority view. 3 Yet the danger exists that the
confusing language embraced in Hamric will be misinterpreted and
used incorrectly in future decisions. Thus, a clear statement on this
question is desirable to clear the air of existing doubts.
Edward Perry Johnson

13

Defendant's Instruction No. 16 read, The Court instructs the jury
that self defense is not based upon actual necessity; and that if they
believe from a preponderance of the evidence to their satisfaction that
the defendant believed that she was threatened by the deceased with
death or great bodily harm and if they believe that the circumstances
were such that a reasonable prudent person would be justified in
believing, and if the defendant did believe, that the danger of death
or great bodily harm from the deceased was actual or imminent and
that such danger could only be averted by taking the life of deceased, then the homicide was justifiable and the defense of self
defense is valid and you must find the defendant not guilty. Record,
p. 303, State v. Hamric, 151 S.E.2d (W. Va. 1966).
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